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Committee Decisicis under Majority Rule: 
An Experimental Study * 
MORRIS P. FIORINA AND CHARLES R. PLOTT 
California Institute of Technology 
This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under 
majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was 
one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models 
drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the 
experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncooperative game without side 
payments (equivalent to the majority rule equilibrium) consistently performed best. Significantly, 
however, even when such an outcome did not exist, the experimental results did not display the 
degree of unpredictability that some theoretical work would suggest. An important subsidiary 
finding concerns the difference between experiments conducted under conditions of high stakes 
versus those conducted under conditions of much lower stakes. The findings in the two conditions 
differed considerably, thus calling into question the political applicability of numerous social 
psychological experiments in which subjects had little or no motivation. 
1. Introduction 
Committee decision making constitutes a 
long-standing concern of political scientists.1 
Congressional committees have received a great 
deal of attention,2 but committees at other 
levels of government have not escaped notice. 
Generally, it is fair to say that committee 
research is stronger on the empirical side than 
on the theoretical. The primary emphasis lies 
on understanding a specific committee and 
perhaps the larger political system (e.g., Con- 
gress) within which the committee exists. Only 
a secondary emphasis lies on formulating gen- 
eralizations which could be applied to commit- 
tee situations removed from those studied. And 
seldom is a committee study regarded simply as 
a data source against which broad theoretical 
generalizations could be checked.3 
*The financial support for this research was pro- 
vided by the National Science Foundation, Economics 
and Political Science Programs. We gratefully 
acknowledge this support. For their invaluable re- 
search assistance and healthy skepticism we thank 
Randy Calvert, Linda Cohen, James Hong, and Darwin 
Niekirk. We also wish to thank John Jackson whose 
comments helped shape some aspects of this research. 
lWoodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 
(New York: Meridian, 1956). 
2Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: 
A Case Study," American Political Science Review, 48 
(June 1954), 340-65; Richard E. Fenno, The Power 
of the Purse (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). 
3For example, in the introduction to The Power of 
the Purse, Fenno writes (p. xiii): 
One finds quite a different emphasis in the 
mathematics, operations research, and eco- 
nomics literature. There one discovers numer- 
ous general models of committee decision 
processes, most of which build on game- 
theoretic and social choice-theoretic ideas.4 But 
why are the general principles found here so 
seldom applied by political scientists? It is true 
that the theoretical literature is quite technical, 
and most political scientists have little mathe- 
matical training. But we daresay that political 
scientists would be crowding into mathematics 
classes if they really believed that the technical 
literature had much to offer. 
No doubt a more important reason for the 
The aims of the book are threefold. In order 
of their likely relevance and persuasiveness for 
the reader they are: first, to provide an em- 
pirical description of the contemporary ap- 
propriations process in Congress; second, to 
demonstrate the importance of the commit- 
tee-centered analysis for increasing an under- 
standing of Congress; and third, to suggest the 
usefulness of certain bits of theory for students 
of Congress and its committees. 
4Charles R. Plott, "Axiomatic Social Choice Theo- 
ry: An Overview and Interpretation," American Jour- 
nal of Political Science, 20 (August 1976), 511-96; 
William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction 
to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1973), passim; Peter Fishburn, The 
Theory of Social Choice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1973); John Ferejohn and Morris 
Fiorina, "Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior," 
American Economic Review Proceedings and Papers, 
65 (May 1975), 407-14. 
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lack of contact between mainstream political 
science and the technical literature is the 
difficulty in evaluating the latter. The models 
embody a curious mixture of positive and 
normative concerns. They are developed and 
advanced without a hint of possible operational 
definitions-one can find proof upon proof, but 
one searches in vain for a detailed discussion of 
exactly how and when a model should be 
applied. By relying, almost solely on logical 
validity, the technical literature has spawned 
many generalizations. But applied scientists 
simply cannot tell which of these might be 
usefully employed in field research. And they 
have neither the inclination nor the training to 
familiarize themselves with them all. 
If theorists blithely continue to prove more 
theorems, and applied scientists doggedly con- 
tinue to gather more data, at some point data 
and theory might miraculously conjoin. But we 
regard such a union as more likely to result 
from a determined effort than from a fortui- 
tous accident. We have begun a program of 
research intended to bring together formal 
models and actual behavior. In this paper we 
report on the initial section of our work, a 
program of experimental research into the 
decision processes of small committees operat- 
ing under majority rule. 
We are quite aware of (and even share) the 
discipline's skepticism about the usefulness of 
experimental methods. What makes us believe, 
for example, that we can use college students to 
simulate the behavior of Congress members? 
Nothing. Our beliefs are much more modest. 
We intend to use the laboratory as a screen for 
basic ideas: if a given model does not predict 
well relative to others under a specified set of 
conditions in the controlled world of the 
laboratory, why should it receive preferential 
treatment as an explanation of non-laboratory 
behavior occurring under similar conditions? 
While laboratory success by no means implies 
field study success for a model, laboratory 
failure raises grave doubts about a model's 
applicability in field studies. Thus, while we 
reject the suggestion that the laboratory can 
replace creative field researchers, we do main- 
tain that it can help them decide which ideas 
deserve further consideration. 
There are a number of other problems which 
we do not wish to avoid. Rather than raise 
them in an introduction, however, we prefer to 
consider them in the light of what we have 
done. Thus, additional discussion of our par- 
ticular brand of experimental methodology 
appears in the concluding section of this article. 
2. The Committee Process 
We constructed the experimental setting to 
be a simplified case of the general class of 
committees which we wish to understand. This 
class of committees is defined by four condi- 
tions: 
a. Individual committee members are not 
uncertain about the consequences of any 
committee decision, i.e., they fully un- 
derstand the effect which alternative 
committee decisions will have on them. 
b. Committee members have clear, constant 
preferences over the objects of the com- 
mittee decision. The committees are mak- 
ing decisions about things that matter to 
them. They are not solving problems or 
making judgments about things for which 
they have no personal preference. 
c. There is no previously fixed parlia- 
mentary procedure other than minimal 
rules of order and majority rule. 
d. There are no extra-committee agreements 
or private deliberations among subsets of 
committee members. 
Basically, we wish to explain what goes on 
within the "black box" of committee decision 
making. We focus on the period after biological, 
sociological and psychological processes have 
operated to instill clear preferences in commit- 
tee members. The question then is simply how 
a committee whose members have clear, con- 
flicting preferences arrive at a decision in the 
simple institutional setting we create. Clearly, 
the political world we have designed lacks the 
institutional complexity of more naturally oc- 
curring political committees, and it is possible 
that the existence of alternative conditions 
might induce behavior different from that 
which occurs in our simple situations. But we 
believe that our experimental design captures 
the essence of the basic majority rule commit- 
tee process. And, as it turns out, for this most 
basic committee process several models work 
quite well indeed, while many other proposed 
models do not work at all. 
3. Experimental Procedures, 
Setting and Design 
Procedures and Subjects. The research consists 
of 65 committee decision-making sessions. All 
the committees were five-person and all made 
decisions by majority rule. Subjects in the 
experiments were typically students from the 
University of Southern California, Pasadena 
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City College, California State University at Los 
Angeles, and Los Angeles City College.5 They 
were recruited from the classes of cooperating 
instructors and in cafeterias and other areas 
where students congregate. Each subject was 
permitted to participate in only one experi- 
mental session. Post-experiment conversations 
with instructors and subjects indicated that the 
subjects were cooperative in declining to discuss 
the experiment with outsiders after participat- 
ing. Thus, subjects generally knew little or 
nothing about the experiment before reading 
the instructions. 
Recruits were asked to appear at a desig- 
nated time and place. At the maximum, four 
experiments were conducted simultaneously 
(20 subjects) but a few extra subjects always 
were recruited in order to assure the necessary 
number. Extras were paid $2.00 for time and 
trouble and dismissed (none was permitted to 
observe). Once the recruits were assembled, 
assignments to committees and assignments to 
positions within committees were determined 
randomly. After reading the instructions (Ap- 
pendix A) each committee went to a separate 
meeting room where deliberations immediately 
began. 
Experimental Setting. The substance of the 
decision was simple. Each committee was asked 
to select a single point on the blackboard by 
majority rule. A coordinate system was drawn 
on the blackboard and each subject was as- 
signed a payoff function defined over ordered 
pairs of the coordinate system. That is, subject i 
was assigned a payoff function Ui(x 1,x2), i = 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, which indicated the amount of 
money he or she would receive from the 
experimenter expressed as a function of the 
point, (xl,x2) chosen by the committee. (See 
Appendix B for an example, and Appendix C 
for all functions.) The instructions clearly 
stated that no threats, side-payments or post- 
experiment deals were permissible. In fact, our 
instructions prohibited any discussion of mone- 
tary amounts.6 So as long as individuals prefer 
5An occasional working adult (e.g., gardener, secre- 
tary) appeared among our subjects. Our subjects 
included members of racial minorities and women. We 
are aware that some social psychologists prefer subject 
populations to be racially or sexually homogeneous. 
But the class of models in which we are interested 
gives us no reason to differentiate among blacks, 
whites, chicanos, men and women. 
6This restriction serves two functions. First, it 
enhances control over the experiment. Outside deals 
which induce preference changes in subjects but not in 
more money to less, their preferences for points 
on the blackboard are represented7 by the 
functions LP(x1,x2). 
This setting seems to assure that our com- 
mittees were of the type designated by con- 
ditions (a) and (b) in section 2. There appears 
to be little uncertainty and, as long as the 
functions Ui(xl,x2) have adequate slope, there 
is no general indifference. The method of 
recruitment assured that condition (d) was 
satisfied. This leaves only (c) open to operation- 
al question. 
The committees made their decisions under 
a simple set of parliamentary procedures. Each 
committee began at the point (200, 150). That 
is, the status quo in each experiment was the 
extreme northeast point in the issue space. 
Upon recognition by the chair (experimenter), 
any subject could propose an amendment (no 
second required) to the motion on the floor. If 
it passed (possibly following discussion in ses- 
sions where discussion was allowed), the 
amendment became the new motion on the 
floor and the process continued. At any point 
during the experiment a motion to end debate 
was in order. If a majority consented, the 
motion on the floor was then voted up or 
down. If the motion passed, the experiment 
ended, and if it failed, the floor was again 
thrown open for amendments. Thus, each of 
our committees pushed a point around the 
blackboard until a majority voted to quit and 
go home.8 Subjects were paid in cash at the 
the models are made difficult to negotiate. Further- 
more, social stigmas regarding monetary endowments 
which also can induce uncontrolled preferences are 
minimized when monetary amounts are not public. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a cardinal 
measure of returns is not a general property of a broad 
range of committee processes. As in our experiments 
political decision makers can learn the order in which 
their fellow decision makers regard alternative pro- 
posals. They can attempt to communicate intensity 
through anger, other displays of emotion, and effort. 
But objectively given cardinal measures of returns are 
generally absent. 
7For all (xl, x2) and (x'1, x'2) we know that (xl, 
x2)Ri(x'l, x'2) if and only if U1(xl, x2) > UO(x'L 
x'2). So the binary relation Ri is the preference 
relation. 
8It is interesting to compare this stopping rule with 
that used by Peter Halfpenny and Michael Taylor, "An 
Experimental Study of Individual and Collective Deci- 
sion Making," British Journal of Political Science, 3 
(1973), 425-44. In their experiments Halfpenny and 
Taylor operationally defined an equilibrium as a 
5-time winner, i.e., the experiment ended when a 
motion on the floor had defeated five alternative 
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conclusion of the experiment. 
The above-described process allows the par- 
liamentary procedures to be essentially en- 
dogenous and as "natural" as possible, con- 
sistent with order. The recognition feature was 
followed only loosely, with many informal 
proposals made and rejected during discussions 
in those experiments without communication 
restrictions. A variety of more complex proce- 
dures can be found in use, and the behavior of 
committees under each must ultimately be 
examined. But we take our procedures to be an 
operational interpretation of condition (c). 
Thus, we created five-person committees, 
induced preferences for outcomes among the 
committee members, and gave them a decision 
motions. In our Series 1 experiments 24 proposals in 
17 experiments defeated 5 or more alternatives but 
did not go on to become the group decision. Thus, 17 
of 40 experimental outcomes would have been dif- 
ferent had we taken action to stop the experiments 
rather than allowing them to take their course (and 
assuming such a rule left individual behavior un- 
changed). This example graphically illustrates the 
potential impact of procedural variations on experi- 
mental outcomes. 
rule (absolute majority rule). Beyond this they 
were free to do what they wanted. They sat 
together and communicated openly. If they 
wished to form coalitions, fine. If they wished 
to be "fair," fine. If they wished to attempt to 
maximize group gain, fine. If they wished to do 
nothing, fine. The lack of structure imposed by 
our instructions was demonstrated by the fact 
that subjects regularly asked "What are we 
supposed to do?" ("Get what's best for our- 
selves?" "Do what's fair?" etc.) We shrugged 
off such questions with a poker-faced, "What- 
ever you want," and read again the relevant 
sections of our instructions. 
4. Experimental Series and 
Competing Models 
Experimental Series. The three separate series 
reported here differ according to the induced 
preference configuration. These differences are 
reflected in Figure 1 for Series 1, Figure 2 for 
Series 2, and Figure 3 for Series 3, where the 
five points are the points of maximum payoff 
for subjects 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The 
circles on Figures 1 and 3 and the ellipses on 
Figure 2 indicate the shape of the indifference 
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curves. The particular shapes and configurations 
were chosen strategically, as will be explained 
below. 
Pilot experiments as well as some theoretical 
concerns suggested that in certain respects 
committees with small incentives behaved dif- 
ferently from committees with large incentives. 
In addition, pilot experiments suggested that 
the amount and type of communication made a 
systematic difference. This led to the examina- 
tion of two different payoff magnitudes and 
two different communications conditions. 
The 40 experimental sessions of Series 1 
were divided into 4 subseries of 10 experiments 
each. The high-payoff condition employed pay- 
offs similar to the example contained in Ap- 
pendix B. The low-payoff condition specified 
much lower maximum payoffs and a smaller 
rate of loss as the outcome departed from the 
maximum. Appendix C gives full details. The 
communication condition varied from full com- 
munication-in which subjects could talk about 
anything they wished, other than the monetary 
aspects of their preferences-to no communica- 
tion. In the latter condition subjects could do 
nothing except make proposals and vote. 
As discussed below, Series 1 confirmed the 
initial hypothesis that low-incentive committees 
and high-incentive committees behave substan- 
tially differently. Because the models with 
which we are most familiar were most ap- 
plicable to the high-payoff case, and because 
the communication condition seemed to make 
little difference in this case, we chose to follow 
the high-payoff, full-communication path in the 
remainder of our experiments. 
Series 2 and 3 were both constructed to 
discriminate among models which gave iden- 
tical, accurate predictions in the high-payoff 
case in Series 1. The logic behind these par- 
ticular designs is explained in the following 
section. 
Competing Models. Given our simple setting, 
there are a remarkable number of potentially 
applicable models which differ from one 
another in their assumptions about the behavior 
patterns of committee members. Although 
these models are motivated by reasonably 
well-articulated theories, it is often unclear how 
these theories apply to our situation, if at all. 
Thus, of necessity, we have taken the liberty of 
identifying predictions which incorporate the 
spirit of the respective theories. Possibly we 
have erred. If so, we invite aggrieved parties to 
correct us. 
We have divided the available models into 
two broad classes according to the nature of the 
motivating theory. The theories which lie be- 
hind the first class, called egoistic, have the 
common view of decision makers as self- 
interested maximizers, while the second class, 
non-egoistic, presupposes that committee mem- 
bers look beyond their individual interest to 
some type of collectively optimal, or consensus 
outcome. Egoistic theories can be subdivided 
further into four classes: game-theoretic, coali- 
tion-theoretic, voting-theoretic, and finally, 
agenda-based voting-theoretic. 
Egoistic: Game-Theoretic. The theory of games 
without side payments and without transferable 
utility induces a natural way of modeling our 
committees. One may take the majority rule 
preference relation as the dominance relation. 
(There are other ways to form a dominance 
relation in our setting if patterns of com- 
munication, etc., are considered, but we pro- 
pose this one as most natural.) From this base 
there are several alternative models, two of 
which are listed here. 
1. Core. The core is the set of all un- 
dominated points.9 In our experiments 
the core is point A in Series 1 and 2, and 
does not exist in Series 3. 
2. Van Neumann-Morgenstern Solution. 
This set of points possesses internal and 
external stability properties.10 If a core 
exists, it will be included in all N-M 
solutions. In Series 1 and 2 there is a 
unique N-M solution, point A. In Series 3 
we have not as yet succeeded in comput- 
ing the main simple solution. 
Egoistic: Voting-Theoretic. These models pur- 
port to specify which outcome will be adopted 
by a group of individuals each of whom votes 
sincerely, i.e., in accord with his or her personal 
preferences. 
3. Voting Equilibrium. Introduced by Black 
and formally developed by Plott and 
Sloss, a voting equilibrium is a point 
which can be beaten by no other point in 
a binary contest characterized by sincere 
voting.11 Such a point is A on Figures 1 
9R. J. Aumann, "A Survey of Cooperative Games 
Without Side Payments," in Essays in Mathematical 
Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, ed. M. 
Shubik (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1967). 
10Aumann. 
1"Duncan Black, The Theory of Committee and 
Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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and 2. No such point exists on Figure 3. 
From a mathematical point of view the 
equilibrium is equivalent to the core of 
the appropriate cooperative game. But 
the core develops from concepts of coali- 
tion and joint strategy, whereas these 
concepts play no conceptual role in the 
theory of voting equilibrium.12 
4. Min-Max Set. Developed by Simpson, this 
model predicts that the committee will 
gravitate to a set of points which have the 
property that the maximum number of 
individuals who would benefit from a 
move to some other point is mini- 
mized.1 3 The theory predicts point A for 
all except Series 3, where it predicts the 
set of points in the quadrilateral at the 
center of Figure 3. 
5. Equilibrium under a City Block Metric. 
There are suggestions that the city block 
metric is in some sense more natural than 
the usual Euclidean metric, and that 
decision makers might impose such a 
metric even if there are indications that 
other metrics are more appropriate.14 If 
committee members' indifference curves 
are given by the city block metric, then 
1958); Duncan Black and R. A. Newing, Committee 
Decisions with Complementary Valuations (London: 
William Hodge, 1951); Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of 
Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule," 
American Economic Review, 57 (September 1967), 
797-806; Judith Sloss, "Stable Outcomes in Majority 
Rule Voting Games," Public Choice, 15 (Summer 
1973), 19-48. 
12To draw a theoretical distinction between the 
formally equivalent concepts of core and voting 
equilibrium might strike some of our colleagues as 
unnecessary hair-splitting. To these skeptics we ad- 
dress one further point. In the typical case in which no 
core/equilibrium exists, where does one turn? If one 
has arrived at the core through the game-theoretic 
literature, one naturally turns to some other game- 
theoretic concept such as the N-M solution. But if one 
has arrived at the equilibrium through the voting- 
theoretic literature, one turns to some other voting- 
theoretic model such as the min-max set or an agenda 
theory. When it exists, the core/equilibrium is the 
intersection of several branches of theory. But that is 
not to deny that these branches are distinct. 
13Paul B. Simpson, "On Defining Areas of Voter 
Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83 
(August 1969), 478-90. 
14Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, "Decision 
Rules and Policy Outcomes," British Journal of 
Political Science, 1 (1971), 71-90; also, Halfpenny 
and Taylor, "An Experimental Study." 
the equilibrium under majority rule with 
an odd number of voters is the unique 
intersection of the perpendicular hyper- 
planes through the median voter along 
each dimension. This point is A in Series 
1 and B in Series 2 and 3. 
Egoistic: Agenda-Based Voting-Theoretic. The 
agenda procedures used by a committee can 
influence if not completely dictate the deci- 
sion.1 5 This fact raises the possibility that there 
is some "natural" agenda which committees 
tend to use even if it is not formally specified. 
A general model of committee decisions would 
be interpreted as having two steps. First, there 
would be a prediction about which agenda the 
committee would adopt, and then, secondly, a 
prediction about how the committee will be- 
have once an agenda has been adopted. 
6. Obvious Agenda. Each individual will 
propose his or her best point at some 
time during the meeting. In particular, 
individual 1 will propose his or her best 
point: A. Notice that point A is preferred 
by a majority when put against any other 
point. Thus, if individuals vote sincerely, 
which tends to be the case with a fixed 
agenda,16 A will win whenever it is 
proposed. Although this reasoning sug- 
gests point A as a prediction for Series 1 
and 2, it makes no prediction for Series 
3. 
7. Dimension by Dimension Median. A "na- 
tural" procedure might be to choose a 
point along one dimension by majority 
rule, then, holding that point fixed, 
choose a point along a second dimension, 
hold it fixed, and continue in similar 
fashion until a choice has been made 
along each dimension. If committee 
members vote sincerely, the chosen point 
would be A in Series 1, B in Series 3, and 
points C in Series 2. (This model can 
make as many as n! predictions, where n 
is the dimensionality of the alternative 
space, depending upon the order in which 
the dimensions are considered.) 
8. Sincere Binary Voting and Arbitrary Pro- 
posals. Suppose all motions involve a 
comparison of two outcomes-a motion 
1SCharles R. Plott and Michael E. Levine, "On 
Using the Agenda to Influence Group Decision: 
Theory, Experiments and Application," American 
Economic Review, forthcoming. 
16Plott and Levine, "On Using the Agenda." 
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on the floor and an amendment as 
outlined above. Amended motions are 
the new motion on the floor and are 
subject to amendment. Suppose further 
that individuals always vote sincerely and 
that amendments arise in some type of 
"hill climbing" fashion. The idea behind 
the model is, then, that the majority- 
d o minance relation in some sense 
"drives" or "forces" the motion on the 
floor. For Series 1 the model predicts A. 
Because there is a transitive majority 
winner, with a "majority best" alterna- 
tive, every chain of proposals leads there. 
For Series 2 the prediction is not clear 
because in this design cycles exist. Not 
every sequence in Series 2 will necessarily 
lead to the core or equilibrium. In Series 
3 there is no core or equilibrium. 
McKelvey's theorem tells us that any two 
points in Series 3 can be connected via 
some majority-rule sequence.17 Thus, we 
interpret the model as saying that "any- 
thing can happen" in Series 3. 
9. Agenda Manipulation. Plott and Levine 
hypothesize that some individuals have 
good intuition about the influence of the 
agenda.18 When no formally imposed 
agenda exists, the agenda becomes part of 
each individual's strategy set, and because 
it is known to greatly influence the 
outcome, the individual with the best 
intuition can use it to personal advantage. 
From this line of reasoning we predict 
the set of points D of individual maxi- 
mums. 
Egoistic: Coalition Theories. Coalition theories 
agree that the decision will be made as if it 
results from a two-step process-although they 
might differ as to which step comes first. One 
step is the formation of a coalition with the 
power to institute decisions. The other step is 
the choice of decisions for the coalition to 
implement. 
10. Minimum Winning Coalitions. The idea 
developed by Riker is that only coalitions 
of minimal winning size will form.19 We 
17Richard McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multi- 
dimensional Voting Models and Implications for Agen- 
da Control," Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 
472-82. 
18C. R. Plott and Michael E. Levine, "On Using the 
Agenda." 
19William Riker, A Theory of Political Coalitions 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). 
take it that the implemented decision will 
be the "center" of the formed minimal 
winning coalition. There are ten such 
coalitions, so the model predicts that the 
outcome will be one of the ten points 
labeled E on Figure 1. This model was 
rejected in favor of other models in Series 
1. Thus, its predictions were not carried 
forward to Series 2 and 3. (Any model 
rejected in one series was eliminated from 
further consideration.) 
11. Resource Coalition Theories. Sociologists 
such as Gamson, and Komorita and 
Chertkoff hypothesize that once a coali- 
tion forms, the payoff to coalition mem- 
bers will follow an equity norm or parity 
norm based on the resources supplied by 
each coalition member.20 In our experi- 
ments the only "resource" a committee 
member possesses is a vote, and the 
situation is clearly one person-one vote. 
Thus, we interpret these models as identi- 
fying the point equidistant from the best 
point of each person in a coalition. Given 
these points, each person can rank each 
coalition according to his or her expected 
payoff in it. If some coalition is ranked 
best by all of its members, there is a 
presumption that it will form and behave 
according to expectations. In our experi- 
ment players 1, 2, 3 should join and 
choose E. 
12. Minimal Winning Coalition of Maximum 
Value. The coalition which could achieve 
the largest total payoff is (1, 2, 31. The 
point F achieves this coalitional maxi- 
mum. 21 
20Wi~liam Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Forma- 
tion," American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 
373 -82; S. S. Komorita and Jerome M. Chertkoff, "A 
Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation," Psycho- 
logical Review, 80 (May 1973), 149-62. 
21Qbviously, our procedures (no communication 
of monetary amounts) work against any theory which 
specifies that the committee or a subgroup of it tries 
to achieve a group maximum (models 12 and 13). Of 
course, the political world also works against any such 
theory in that cardinal measures of preferences which 
group maximization theories presuppose are typically 
not available (footnote 3). And even if objectively 
known monetary payoffs are available, there still is no 
theoretical justification for asserting the equivalence 
of a maximum of group monetary payoff and group 
utility payoff. But for reasons discussed under model 
13 we can not dismiss out-of-hand models which 
contain group or subgroup maximization processes. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 14:41:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1978 Committee Decisions under Majority Rule 583 
Non-Egoistic. These theories have in common 
the premise that principles more general than 
individual selfishness explain group decision 
making. We content ourselves with four pos- 
sibilities. 
13. Maximum Group Return. Even though 
individuals cannot express monetary 
amounts, they can and do express the 
intensity of their feelings by shows of 
emotion, willingness, or unwillingness to 
cooperate, etc. In such ways the group 
interaction could carry the process to a 
point which maximizes group return.22 
If such behavior is observed, a deeper 
explanation could proceed in terms of 
some concept of group welfare. This is 
point G in Series 1. 
14. Fair Point. Pilot experiments suggested 
that a likely candidate for a "fair" 
outcome was the average of the points of 
individual maximum. This point also hap- 
pens to be the centroid, the point which 
minimizes the sum of Euclidean distance 
from the points of individual maxi- 
mum.23 In each series this point is 
designated H. 
15. Dominant Personality. Perhaps some in- 
dividuals have such strong personalities 
that deference overrides any other incen- 
tives experimentally induced in the other 
individuals. The idea, as presented here, is 
in part a "straw man" since we have 
found no clear reference from which to 
draw it. Nevertheless, a feeling that vari- 
ables like this are important seems perva- 
sive. If it is true that individual 
preferences are substantially influenced 
in group interactions, then we would be 
prepared to look in this direction for an 
explanatory model. We take the predic- 
tion here to be neighborhoods around the 
individual maxima, points D. 
16. Obvious Point. Schelling's idea can be 
adapted to our scenario.24 Is there a 
22Bernhardt Lieberman, "Combining Individual 
Preferences into a Social Choice," in Social Choice, ed. 
Bernhardt Lieberman (New York: Gordon and Breach, 
1971), pp. 5-25. 
23R. A. Hanson and P. M. Rice, "Policy Outcomes 
in Decision Making Groups," paper delivered at the 
annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 1972. 
24Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
"prominent" or "obvious" place to go- 
perhaps other than one of the points 
outlined above? In each series there is 
one individual maximum in the interior 
of the convex hull of the individual 
maxima. We take the point A in Series 1 
and Series 2 and point B in Series 3 as the 
obvious point predictions. 
5. Experimental Results 
Series 1. The Series 1 design affords an oppor- 
tunity to make a first broad cut among the 
numerous models discussed in the preceding 
section. The design is such that the egoistic 
voting-theoretic, agenda-based voting-theoretic 
and game-theoretic models conflict with the 
egoistic coalition-theoretic and non-egoistic 
models. As mentioned above, pilot experiments 
suggested that both payoff size and amount of 
communication affected experimental out- 
comes. Thus, although most of the candidate 
models say nothing terribly precise about these 
variables, a class of models might possibly work 
well under one set off payoff/communication 
conditions, but not others. For example, we 
anticipated that the entire class of non-egoistic 
theories would perform better with com- 
munication and with low payoffs. Conversely, 
restricted communication and high payoffs 
would appear to maximize the chances of a 
good performance by certain of the egoistic 
theories. Thus, we conducted 40 experiments, 
10 each in the 4 combinations of low/high 
payoffs, no/free communication described in 
section 4. 
Table 1 contains the outcomes for the 40 
experiments of Series 1. The findings for the 
low and high payoff conditions differ, so we 
will discuss them separately. 
The mean outcome in the high-payoff condi- 
tion is almost exactly the point, A, of Figure 1. 
No other model of those under consideration 
predicts the experimental outcomes nearly so 
well. The apparently complex but conceptually 
simple Figure 4 graphically illustrates the com- 
parative performance of the three classes of 
models. In Figure 4 each point identified in 
Figure 1 is enclosed by a shape which separates 
all points closer (in Euclidean distance) to it 
than to any other predicted point. For purposes 
of display we have pooled the observations 
from the two communications conditions. 
Clearly, the point A wins hands down. Four- 
teen of 20 outcomes are closer to it than to any 
other predicted point. One outcome is closer to 
the committee maximum than to any other 
point. Of the remainder, two are closest to the 
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Table 1. Experimental Outcomes: Series 1 
High Payoff Low Payoff 
No No 
Communication Communication Communication Communication 
Outcomes (34,69) (37,72) (50,70) (62,109) 
(36,66) (39,68)* (60,80) (30,52) 
(32,65) (55,71) (39,66) (45,68) 
(40,70) (32,70) (39,68)* (39,68)* 
(46,68) (40,71) (39,68)* (39,68)* 
(39,68)* (40,67) (25,72) (30,60) 
(34,69) (40,67) (40,68) (33,70) 
(37,70) (25,65) (100,70) (30,65) 
(43,70) (30,70) (50,85) (30,70) 
(30,68) (39,68)* (31,70) (25,72) 
Mean (37,68) (38,69) (47,72) (36,70) 
Standard Deviation 5.2 8.3 21.9 (17.3) 
*Majority Rule Equilibrium 
Location (39,68) (39,68) (39,68) (39,68) 
Total Payoff $37.86 $37.86 $32.49 $32.49 
Group Mean 
Location (64,67) (64,67) (64,67) (64,67) 
Total Payoff $33.41 $33.41 $32.44 $32.44 
Group Maximum 
Location (51,75) (51,75) (75,68) (75,68) 
Total Payoff $57.95 $57.95 $32.89 $32.89 
mean of the (1, 2, 3) minimal winning coali- 
tion, two to the joint maximum of the (1, 2, 3) 
coalition (although one falls outside the Pareto 
optimals), and the last is closest to Player 3's 
ideal point. 
Table 1 suggests rather strongly that when 
individuals have a good deal at stake, one had 
better model their behavior via a theory which 
includes point A among its predictions. The 
Series 1 high-payoff experiments provide 
grounds for rejecting models 9-15, in favor of 
1-8, 16. Moreover, the Series 1 results also 
suggest a subtle way of distinguishing between 
models 1 and 2, and models 3-8. Note that the 
point, A, appears equally good as a prediction 
in both the communication and non- 
communication cases. This apparently supports 
the view that the processes driving the results 
are more likely to be similar to those underly- 
ing the voting-theoretic models than to those 
underlying the game-theoretic models, given 
that the latter seem to presuppose coalitions 
and joint strategy choices, i.e., a generally high 
degree of communication and coordination. 
What about the low-payoff experiments? 
When full communication is permitted, the 
mean outcome is much farther to the right (47, 
72) than in the high-payoff condition. Some 
committees attempt to accommodate the ex- 
treme individual.25 Thus, charity or altruism 
apparently has its price and in these experi- 
ments, that price lies somewhere between a few 
cents and a few dollars per unit. When com- 
munication is not permitted the mean outcome 
is similar to that in the high-payoff case, 
although the variance is much higher. Thus, 
there is an interaction between communication 
and payoff conditions, with the difference 
between the payoff conditions being less in the 
absence of communication. 
Overall, though, the differences in payoffs 
appear to be a more significant influence on the 
outcome of the committee process than dif- 
ferences in communication. Given high payoffs, 
the egoistic theories work equally well with or 
without communication. Given low payoffs, all 
25lnterestingly enough, this seeming altruism has 
an ironic twist. Subjects often made the incorrect 
assumption that their payoffs were identical. But the 
asymmetry in payoff structures (Figure 2) leads to the 
result that if Players 1, 2, 3 heeded the pleas of Players 
4 and/or 5 to move farther north and/or east than the 
equilibrium, then the fringe players got significantly 
more in absolute terms than the more centrally 
located players, although the outcome remained rela- 
tively closer to the latter. 
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the models work rather poorly with or without 
communication. The best of a bad lot of 
models in the low-payoff condition are the 
"agenda manipulator" and the "dominant per- 
sonality" models-8 of 20 outcomes fall on 
individual ideal points. Strangely, though, 5 of 
these 8 outcomes occur in the no communica- 
tion case where the operation of personal 
factors presumably is minimal. Thus, the agen- 
da manipulator appears to be somewhat more 
plausible than the personality theory. 
In addition to experimental outcomes, there 
are other more impressionistic findings to re- 
port. As one would expect, behavior in the 
experiments differed between the communica- 
tion and non-communication conditions. In the 
HP non-communication condition subjects pro- 
posed and voted on amendment after amend- 
ment (mean 28). In the communication condi- 
tion the subjects made fewer official amend- 
ments (mean 16) but actually considered many 
more informally. Subjects often became quite 
involved with the decision in the communica- 
tion condition. They cajoled, pleaded, some- 
times wrote on the board, invented fair division 
schemes (usually consistent with their own 
self-interest) and generally created an interest- 
ing and enjoyable observational context for the 
experimenter. Frequently "leaders" emerged in 
the communication condition. These were 
people who took it upon themselves to gather 
and organize information from the other sub- 
jects and "work out" an acceptable decision. 
Contrary to naive expectations, these individu- 
als did not generally do better than non-leaders. 
Coalitions were very rare in the Series 1 
experiments. On only a handful of occasions 
did we observe a subgroup of the committee 
arrive at a decision without regard for the 
wishes of the remaining committee members. 
The atmosphere of the experiments tended to 
be friendly and cooperative; irritation some- 
times showed, but seldom did personal animosi- 
ty surface. Even suggestions about coalitions 
(e.g., "let's end it; we've got the votes") 
typically were rebuffed by one or more com- 
mittee members. Perhaps if we were to en- 
courage subgroups of our committees to bar- 
gain privately we might find more coalitional 
activity, but for the experiments reported, we 
must conclude that coalition theories do not 
provide a basis for explaining either the com- 
mittee processes or outcomes. 
Finally, we found it interesting that subjects 
sometimes resorted to intellectual short-cuts 
such as satisficing in our experiments (e.g., "I 
drew this square around my ideal point and 
voted against anything outside of it and for 
anything inside"). In these experiments each 
subject's preferences were clearly laid out with 
dollars and cents figures available for each 
comparison of alternatives. Nevertheless, some 
subjects opted for simpler ways of making a 
decision. In the real world such difficulties are 
compounded. How many of us know that our 
preference for one Defense Procurement Bill is 
3.62 and for another, 3.95? How much more 
likely are rule-of-thumb intellectual short-cuts 
in such situations? Interestingly, nearly all the 
formal models of committee decision processes 
assume away costs associated with gathering 
information, identifying one's preferences and 
reaching a decision. Yet these factors loom very 
large in the experiments. In the low-payoff 
condition the experimental atmosphere might 
best be described as: "Choose any reasonable 
point and let's go." Perhaps some concept of 
decision-making costs together with the equi- 
librium considerations that receive reasonable 
support in the high-payoff experiments will 
explain the differential Series 1 and 2 results. 
Series 2. Having found three classes of models 
which meet with some laboratory success (ego- 
istic game-theoretic, egoistic voting-theoretic 
and agenda-based voting-theoretic), we elected 
to continue with the high-payoff experiments 
and attempt to make some finer distinctions 
among models 1-8. Moreover, given (1) that 
the full-communication committees are em- 
pirically more common, and (2) that com- 
munication did not appear to make much 
difference with high payoffs, we also elected to 
continue with only full-communication experi- 
ments. 
As seen in Figure 2, Series 2 differed from 
Series 1 in the arrangement of the individual 
maximums and more importantly, in the shapes 
(elliptical v. circular) of the induced indif- 
ference contours. These changes provide the 
opportunity for a conclusive contest between 
models 1-4, 6, and 5, 7, all of which made 
identical predictions in Series 1. In Series 2 
however, model 5 (city block) predicts B with 
coordinates (72, 66). Model 7 predicts points C 
with coordinates (63, 66) and (72, 61). Models 
1-4, and 6 predict A with coordinates (61, 69). 
Table 2 contains the experimental outcomes for 
Series 2, while Figure 6 illustrates them. The 
results are clear. The mean outcome is (60, 72) 
with a standard deviation comparable to that 
for Series 1. Thus, the earlier success of models 
5 and 7 proves to be illusory. When their 
predictions coincide with models 1-4, 6, they 
are upheld. When models 1-4, 6, make a 
different prediction, models 5 and 7 fail to 
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Standard Deviation 7.3 
*Majority Rule Equilibrium (61,69) 
describe the data. Although subjects sometimes 
use intellectual short cuts, these apparently do 
not involve the imposition of simpler 
preference structures based on the city block 
metric. 
Two other points deserve mention. First, we 
now see that the Series 1 results cannot be 
attributed simply to the existence of a transi- 
tive, majority-rule-preference relation in that 
design, i.e., the fact that every sequence of 
proposal adoptions eventually leads to the core 
or equilibrium. In Series 2 cycles exist. Thus, 
not every sequence of proposal adoptions will 
necessarily lead to the core or equilibrium. 
Second, notice the occurrence of non-Pareto 
optimal outcomes in Series 2 (2 of 10). Such 
"social wastage" conflicts with coalition theo- 
retic reasoning, and indeed, with all the funda- 
mental ideas of cooperative game theory. In 
contrast, such pathologies are not uncommon 
in voting-theoretic models.2 6 
Series 3. Those who conduct experiments al- 
ways have an informational advantage over 
those who only see the results, in that forces at 
work in the experiment may not be evident 
from the outcomes alone. For example, one 
could explain the Series 1 outcomes by appeal- 
ing to game-theoretic solution concepts such as 
the core or Von Neumann-Morgenstern solu- 
26Peter Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Voting," Ameri- 
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tion. As we mentioned, however, the concept 
of coalition, on which such solution theories 
depend, appears foreign to our experimental 
decision makers. Thus, observation of the ex- 
periments clearly aids in their explanation. In 
this section we report on a third series of 
experiments which were partially motivated by 
some puzzling phenomena which occurred in 
Series 1. 
Consider Figure 7. This figure shows the 
path" taken by a committee in reaching a 
decision. The committee in Figure 7 made six 
moves. Note that although the committee 
ended up near (39,68), at some point they were 
exactly on it but left. According to models 1-4 
the impossible happened. Thus, looking only at 
the experimental outcomes would lead us to a 
more positive appraisal of these models than 
would an examination of the experimental 
dynamics: the phenomenon illustrated in the 
figures is not uncommon. 
How does one explain the kind of process 
shown in Figure 7? First, note that to move 
from the point (39,68), at least one person 
must vote against his or her self-interest. Gen- 
erally, this is Player 1; the person whose ideal 
point is at the equilibrium chooses not to 
enforce it. Why? The experiments tend to 
proceed roughly as follows. Subjects begin with 
high hopes-many initially do not even suspect 
that the experimenters have placed them in 
conflict. A few proposals and votes quickly 
destroy the initial optimism. One sees frowns 
and hears mutterings as expectations are revised 
downwards. Subjects abandon hopes of getting 
their maximum and begin to work toward some 
reasonable outcome. 
But what is a reasonable outcome? The 
alternative space contains 30,000 integer 
points. Only the five maxima are in any way 
distinguished, unless symmetry considerations 
point to outcomes such as (100,75) which, 
while sometimes mentioned, are quickly dis- 
missed. Among the maxima Player 3 at (39,68) 
is the only one who is in any sense "centrally 
located." In fact, his is the only maximum in 
the interior of the Pareto-optimal surface. Thus, 
perhaps model 16 is driving the Series 1 
experiments. Perhaps (39,68) is a Schelling 
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Figure 7. Sample Decision Path: From Series I-High Payoff 
Final Outcome: (46,68) 
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(39,68)-give or take a little to be "reason- 
able"-might become the "focal point" of 
committee members' expectations inde- 
pendently of its equilibrium properties. Models 
1-4 might appear to predict well even though 
the experimental results depended on quite 
different consideration. 
Series 3 differs from Series 1 only in that 
Player 1 is moved from (39,68) to (51,59). 
Although not large, this move clearly destroys 
the equilibrium/core. If the experimental re- 
sults remain clustered and simply "follow" 
Player 1 to (51,59), one would have grounds 
for rejecting the equilibrium model in favor of 
some coordinated expectations model. Table 3 
contains the outcomes of the 15 experiments in 
Series 3, while Figure 8 illustrates them 
graphically. 
Evidently, the results of Series 3 are am- 
biguous. To some extent the outcomes "track" 
Player 1-the mean shifts outward to (45,62). 
But Player l's position (51,59) is certainly not 
the mean of the experimental outcomes as in 
Series 1, nor is it ever an experimental out- 
come. A comparison of the outcome variance 
yields a similarly ambiguous decision. On the 
one hand the standard deviation is twice as 
large as in the high-payoff, Series 1 experi- 
ments. But on the other hand, the outcomes 

















Standard Deviation 10.3 
continue to cluster in a particular region, rather 
than fall at widely dispersed position in the 
space. 
In a recent paper McKelvey proves a rather 
striking result.27 If committee members evalu- 
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Figure 8. Series 3. Observations 
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ate policies in terms of utility functions based 
on the Euclidean metric, then in the absence of 
an equilibrium, the space of potential outcomes 
coincides with the entire policy space. From 
any point in the space one can construct a 
sequence of alternative policies which under 
sincere voting lead to any arbitrarily selected 
point. McKelvey's result induces an interesting 
either-or hypothesis: if equilibrium exists, then 
equilibrium occurs; if not, then chaos, with the 
latter much more likely than the former. 
McKelvey conjures up the spectre purportedly 
exorcised by Tullock.28 
Evidently, however, this pessimistic natural 
hypothesis induced by McKelvey's theorem is 
not operating in our experiments. In Series 1 
the existence of an equilibrium is associated 
with a tightly clustered set of outcomes cen- 
tered on the equilibrium. But in Series 3 the 
nonexistence of an equilibrium is not associated 
with experimental chaos. We did not notice any 
behavioral differences in the conduct of the 
two series; in particular, subjects in Series 3 
appeared to have no greater difficulty in reach- 
ing a decision than did those in Series 1. 
Perhaps some general theory exists which could 
explain both Series 2 and 3. If some as yet 
undeveloped theory is driving the Series 3 
experiments, it had better specialize to the 
equilibrium/core when the latter exists. The 
min-max set (model 4) is one such theory, but 
it really does not do very well: of 15 Series 3 
outcomes, only 3 are contained in it.29 
In sum, Series 3 both settles and raises 
questions. On the one hand the pattern of 
results leads us to believe that model 16 is not 
driving the Series 1 results, that the existence of 
an equilibrium in Series 1 makes a real dif- 
ference. On the other hand, the pattern of 
experimental findings does not explode, a fact 
which makes us wonder whether some unidenti- 
fied theory is waiting to be discovered and 
used. 
6. Conclusions 
What have we learned from the research just 
described? What we expected to learn changed 
during the course of the project. We began with 
28Gordon Tullock, "The General Irrelevance of the 
General Impossibility Theorem," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 81 (May 1967), 256-70. 
29There are various game-theoretic solution con- 
cepts (N-M Solution, Bargaining Set, Competitive 
Solution) not as yet computed which also remain live 
candidates. 
the presumption that none of the models found 
in the literature could survive a careful experi- 
mental evaluation, that our experimental com- 
mittees would produce outcomes "all over the 
map," so to speak. In all candor, we suspected 
that formal models of committee processes had 
little to recommend them other than logical 
rigor. 
This negative presumption went by the 
board rather quickly-after a few pilot experi- 
ments, in fact. Some of the models actually 
appeared to work. Thus, our task changed from 
the easy one of generating negative results to a 
more difficult and painstaking one of determin- 
ing why some models work, and when. This 
necessitated careful specification of the avail- 
able models and careful design of experiments 
capable of differentiating among them. This 
conclusion summarizes the results of our first 
efforts, our thoughts about the significance of 
our results for existing theories, and the rele- 
vance of our results for applied research. 
Implications for Basic Committee Research. 
Consider the following question: Is there a 
model which will predict the decision of a 
group under the following conditions? 
a. There is no uncertainty about the con- 
sequences of any decision; 
b. There is no indifference or lack of per- 
sonal interest on the part of committee 
members; 
c. The committee uses majority rule but 
little or no additional formal procedure 
such as an agenda; and 
d. There are no caucuses or extra-committee 
meetings among members of the commit- 
tee. 
The answer: If the configuration of prefer- 
ences is such that an equilibrium exists and if 
the preferences are strongly held, then, within 
narrow limits the committee's choice will be 
the equilibrium. If the committee members 
have low incentives, then several models do 
equally badly. 
This answer implies several additional con- 
clusions and raises some interesting additional 
questions: 
(1) Numerous widely known models which 
have natural interpretations in this setting do 
not work. Applied scientists who wish to study 
situations falling within our specifications 
should not look to these models for help. Table 
4 provides a list of the models discussed in 
section 4 arranged against the three experi- 
mental series. A t indicates a "best" model and 
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an X indicates a point in which a model was 
eliminated from further consideration. 
(2) In the high-incentive case ($1 to $3 per 
unit) coalition models, most of the agenda 
models and all of the non-egoistic models do a 
very poor job relative to equilibrium models. 
(3) In the low-incentive case (1c to 5c per 
unit), if full communication is allowed, all 
models do poorly. Non-egoistic models, 
especially those based on "fairness," receive 
their only hint of support under these con- 
ditions. If we were forced to generalize, we 
would say that when people are personally 
indifferent or near indifferent, they try to be 
fair, thereby allowing the decision to be pulled 
further from them than the equilibrium out- 
come. 
(4) In the low-incentive case, if no com- 
munication is allowed, all models do poorly. If 
we were forced to generalize we would say that 
the most clever agenda manipulator is the best 
of a poor lot. The incentives are low. People 
want to hurry up, vote, and go. The person who 
interjects a favorite motion at the proper time 
just might get it accepted. 
(5) The fact that different models apply 
according to the magnitude of the incentives 
implies an important methodological conclu- 
sion. A large sample size will not substitute for 
large payoffs in differentiating between models 
designed for understanding high-incentive 
groups.30 Models intended for application in 
high-incentive contexts should not be rejected 
on the basis of data from low-payoff experi- 
ments. 
(6) When an equilibrium does not exist in a 
high-incentive circumstance, the process does 
not "explode." The min-max set does best 
among the models considered, but only because 
of very weak competitors. Nevertheless, the 
resulting pattern of decisions seems "well con- 
tained" and suggests that a further generaliza- 
tion of the equilibrium notion may exist. 
(7) Several ideas in the game theory litera- 
ture provide models which specialize to the 
equilibrium when it exists and also make 
predictions when it does not. Application of 
these models requires precise operationalization 
of the coalition concept-a surprisingly difficult 
task, in our view. As mentioned, we saw little 
of what the literature would have us look for in 
30cf. Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah, 
Prisoner's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michi- 
gan Press, 1965); Peter Halfpenny and Michael Taylor, 
"An Experimental Study of Individual and Collective 
Decision Making." 
identifying a coalition. Moreover, we observed 
equilibrium behavior even in the absence of 
communication (Series 1). Were there "phan- 
tom" coalitions at work in the latter experi- 
ments? Consider also the occurrence of non- 
Pareto-optimal outcomes in Series 2. These are 
inconsistent with all theories of coalition be- 
havior. 
(8) Which of the surviving models is "real- 
ly" the right one? We don't know yet. The data 
are consistent with four general modes of 
thought, that producing the core, the solution, 
the equilibrium and the obvious agenda. Which, 
if any, ultimately prove accurate remains to be 
determined. 
(9) What will happen as conditions (a) 
through (d) are relaxed or varied? As uncertain- 
ty about the outcome is introduced and the 
group takes on a problem-solving as well as 
conflict-resolving aspect, members may or- 
ganize themselves for purpose of information 
processing in a manner which induces coali- 
tion-type behavior. Such an environment, in 
which trust and belief loom large, may also 
revive the personality or other non-egoistic 
models. If the committee organizational en- 
vironment is conducive to private meetings 
among subsets of members, the coalition 
models may receive a breath of life. But in any 
case we emphasize that all of these questions 
are resolvable within the laboratory setting. 
Experiments and Applied Committee Research. 
A more difficult question now arises. We have 
indicated what we appear to have learned from 
the standpoint of basic science. But have we 
learned anything that makes a contribution to 
applied science? Specifically, do our experi- 
mental findings have implications for behavior 
in the larger political world? A significant 
proportion of our colleagues would un- 
doubtedly answer in the negative. What argu- 
ments or beliefs underlie their skepticism? 
Having thought the matter over at some length, 
it seems to us that the most commonly heard 
arguments fall into one of three classes.31 
3MActually, each of the three arguments discussed 
in this section is a member of a more general class 
which holds that the laboratory environment is arti- 
ficial (the word is usually pronounced loudly and 
repeatedly). The specifics of the general criticism 
often are not spelled out-we have tried to do so in 
this section-but at base the criticism appears to stem 
from acceptance of a gestalt psychology view. That is, 
the subtleties of the empirical context are too many 
and/or too complicated to be enumerated. Moreover, 
these variables may interact in such a way that they 
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The first argument simply asserts that "real" 
politicians are different from student subjects. 
Moreover, the argument runs, such differences 
are fundamental and do not merely reflect the 
more complex contexts in which professionals 
operate. This argument suggests that were we to 
conduct our experiments using state legislators 
as subjects, the experimental results would 
differ systematically and significantly from 
those previously obtained. In principle one 
could check the validity of the criticism by 
replicating the experiments using professionals 
as subjects. We have not done so, and therefore 
have no real defense against this first argument. 
We did use a relatively heterogeneous subject 
group and we encourage others to explore the 
bounds of the results across other populations. 
The other two arguments emphasize the fact 
that naturally occurring political committees do 
not exist in splendid isolation. Instead, they are 
frequently embedded in some larger ongoing 
institutional context. This embedding raises the 
following potentially critical question: if the 
committee decision is regarded by the members 
as only one stage in a sequence of games, might 
behavior in the committee reflect strategic 
considerations from the larger game? If so, a 
model which explains the behavior in the larger 
game might produce implications for the com- 
mittee stage which differ substantially from 
those implied by models successful in explain- 
ing the processes of isolated committees. 
The preceding argument raises an obviously 
important consideration: behavior in inter- 
dependent, sequential decisions might reflect 
laws and principles different from those under- 
lying behavior in isolated decisions. On balance, 
we think this second argument makes a con- 
vincing case for not extrapolating our results 
too quickly to the larger political world. We 
make the following observation, however. One 
can gradually (and carefully) complicate a 
research design to make it more analogous to 
real-world political processes. By doing so, we 
are effective only when moved together-precisely the 
kind of variation not allowed in the controlled 
laboratory environment. This view must be taken 
seriously, and ultimately there is only one convincing 
rejoinder, the same that an experimentalist in the 
physical sciences must give to a critic who claims that 
the laws which operate in test tubes or other labora- 
tory environments differ from those which operate in 
the "real world." One can only point to laboratory- 
generated information which has been helpful in field 
or engineering endeavors. Granted, experimental social 
science has not yet progressed to such a level, but we 
are optimistic that it eventually will. 
can determine whether the complications de- 
stroy the applicability of models which work in 
simpler contexts. If they do, we stand a good 
chance of both identifying the precise com- 
plications which do the damage, and modifying 
the models to incorporate such complications. 
Thus, we do not take the second argument as a 
criticism of what we have done or of experi- 
mental methodology in general. Instead, it 
suggests that more experimental work needs to 
be done. We agree. 
A final, third class of arguments also empha- 
sizes the complexity and interdependence of 
naturally occurring political processes. Even if a 
model applies in principle to a naturally occur- 
ring situation, there may be no practical way to 
apply it. In laboratory studies we have easy 
access to the relevant parameters. How, in the 
"real world" where there are old friendships 
and enmities, established working relationships, 
debts, etc., does one identify the alternative 
space and the preferences over that space? For 
example, through exhaustive interviews and 
some suitable scaling technique we might con- 
struct a policy space in which a congressional 
committee, school board, etc., is presumably 
operating. Perhaps we could even approximate 
preferences over this space. Even so, the argu- 
ment runs, isn't the policy space only a tiny 
subspace of the larger alternative space which 
includes all the aforementioned complicating 
factors? Clearly this is an empirical question. 
Answers to such questions can only come from 
the experience (yet to come) of trying to apply 
the models within the limits of prevailing 
measurement technology. The limits of the 
practical are constantly changing, presumably 
in a positive direction. To reject an applicable 
model because of the current practical dif- 
ficulties of using it seems short-sighted, if not 
foolish. 
The preceding arguments should make us 
cautious about assuming correspondences be- 
tween laboratory and naturally occurring poli- 
tical behavior. But neither separately nor in 
combination do these arguments negate the 
existence of those correspondences. The im- 
portant thing is to resist the temptation to leap 
prematurely from the laboratory to the field. 
That transition should come through slow, 
well-chosen steps based on a carefully designed 
program which integrates theory, laboratory 
and field research. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 14:41:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
594 The American Political Science Review Vol. 72 
Appendix A. 
Instructions for 
Full Communication Experiments 
General. You are about to participate in a 
committee process experiment in which one of 
numerous competing alternatives will be chosen 
by majority rule. The purpose of the experi- 
ment is to gain insight into certain features of 
complex political processes. The instructions 
are simple. If you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you might earn a con- 
siderable amount of money. You will be paid in 
cash. 
Instructions to Committee Members. The alter- 
natives are represented by points on the black- 
board. The committee will adopt as the com- 
mittee decision one and only one point. Your 
compensation depends on the particular point 
chosen by the committee (see attached payoff 
chart). For example, suppose your payoff chart 
is that given in Figure 1 and that the commit- 
tee's final choice of alternative is the point 
(x,y) = (170,50). Your compensation in this 
event would be $7,000. If the policy of the 
committee is (140,125) your compensation 
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The point (140,125) is halfway between the 
curve marked $7,000 and the curve marked 
$8,000. So, your compensation is halfway 
between $7,000 and $8,000, i.e., $7,500. If the 
policy is one-quarter of the distance between 
two curves, then your payoff is determined by 
the same proportion (i.e., at (75,50) which is 
one-quarter of the way between $8,000 and 
$9,000, you get $8,250). 
The compensation charts may differ among 
individuals. This means that the patterns of 
preferences differ and the monetary amounts 
may not be comparable. The point which 
would result in the highest payoff to you may 
not result in the highest payoff to someone 
else. You should decide what decision you want 
the committee to make and do whatever you 
wish within the confines of the rules to get 
things to go your way. The experimenters, 
however, are not primarily concerned with 
whether or how you participate so long as you 
stay within the confines of the rules. [Under no 
circumstances may you mention anything quan- 
titative about your compensation. You are free, 
if you wish, to indicate which ones you like 
best, etc., but you cannot mention anything 
about the actual monetary amounts. Under no 
circumstances may you mention anything 
about activities which might involve you and 
other committee members after the experi- 
ment, i.e., no deals to split up afterward or no 
physical threats.] * 
Parliamentary Rules. The process begins with 
an existing motion (200,150) on the floor. You 
are free to propose amendments to this motion. 
Suppose, for example, (170,50) is the motion 
on the floor and you want the group to 
consider the point (140,125). Simply raise your 
hand and when you are recognized by the chair, 
say "I move to amend the motion to 
(140,125)." The group will then proceed to 
vote on the amendment. If the amendment 
passes by a majority vote, the point (140,125) 
is the new motion on the floor and is subject, 
itself, to amendments. If the amendment fails 
the motion (170,50) remains on the floor and is 
subject to further amendment. Thus, amend- 
ments simply change the motion on the floor. 
You may pass as many amendments as you 
wish. 
At any time during the consideration of an 
amendment or the motion on the floor a 
motion to end debate is in order. If there are no 
objections, an immediate vote will take place. If 
there are objections, the motion to end debate 
will itself be put to a majority vote. If the 
motion to end debate fails, the amendment 
process continues. If it passes, a vote on the 
amendment or motion will take place. 
To sum up, the existing motion on the floor 
is (200,150). You are free to amend this 
motion as you wish. The meeting will not end 
until a majority consents to end debate and 
accept some motion. Your compensation will 
be determined by the motion on the floor 
*This section omitted in no-communication condi- 
tion. 
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finally adopted by the majority. 
Are there any questions? 
We would like you to answer the questions 
on the attached page. These should help you 
understand the instructions. 
Test 
1. At I would make the most possible 
money. The amount I would receive is 
2. At I would make the least possible 
money. The amount I would receive is 
3. Suppose (200,150) is the motion on the 
floor and an amendment to move to point 
(199,149) passes (fails), then the new mo- 
tion on the floor is , ( , 
4. Suppose an amendment to move to 
(100,100) passes and no further amend- 
ments pass. If the motion on the floor is 
then adopted by a majority, my com- 
pensation is 
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